To evaluate the performance of private equity (PE) investments, we solve and calibrate a simple asset-allocation model for a risk-averse institutional investor. In addition to traditional stocks and bonds, this investor is a limited partner (LP) in a PE fund. The fund is illiquid and holds a PE asset, managed by a general partner (GP) who generates alpha and charges management and performance fees. Under incomplete markets, we derive tractable expressions for the LP's portfolio weights, consumption rule, and certainty-equivalent valuation of the PE investment. We find that the typically observed 2-20 compensation contract requires a substantial alpha for the LP to break even. Leverage reduces this break-even alpha since the GP can generate alpha on a larger asset base. Evaluating empirical PE performance measures under our model, we find that their usual interpretation seem optimistic. On average, LPs appear to just break even.
Introduction
It is important to understand whether limited partners (LP) in private equity (PE) funds benefit from their investments. The answer to this question is complicated by both empirical and conceptual difficulties: Empirically, it has been difficult to collect systematic performance data for PE investments to calculate traditional risk and return measures, such as alphas and betas. Conceptually, it is not even clear that such traditional measures adequately capture the risks and returns of PE investing. PE investments involves substantial illiquidity, complex compensation contracts, and idiosyncratic risk. These features are not captured by traditional models, such as the CAPM, and the traditional performance measures may be misleading.
In response to these difficulties, practitioners and academics have adopted some alternative performance measures, specifically internal rate of return (IRR), total value to paid in capital (TVPI), and public market equivalent (PME). While these measures have important limitations, as discussed below, they are widely used. Most recently, Harris, Jenkinson, and Kaplan (2011) summarize empirical studies of PE performance. Favoring the PME measure, which assumes that PE investments have the same risk as publicly traded equity (levered beta equal to one), and no illiquidity or idiosyncratic risk, they conclude that "it seems very likely that buyout funds have outperformed public markets in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s." Whether this outperformance is sufficient to compensate LPs for the illiquidity and risk, however, remains an open question.
To provide a first answer to this question, we present and calibrate a new portfoliochoice model. An LP invests in the usual liquid risk-free bond and risky stock (such as the market portfolio) as well as an illiquid PE investment. The PE investment is undiversified and cannot be traded. It has a fixed, typically ten-year, life and must be held to maturity.
At maturity, the PE investment is liquidated, and the LP receives the proceeds net of the general partner's performance fee, called "carried interest" (typically 20%). Additionally, the GP receives ongoing management fees (typically 2%). Intuitively, the carried interest resembles a call option on the underlying investment (the LP is short this option), and the management fee resembles a fixed income stream. To compensate the LP for the costs of management fees, carried interest, idiosyncratic risk, and illiquidity, the GP must generate sufficient excess return (alpha) by effectively managing the underlying assets.
With incomplete markets, the LP requires a risk premium for bearing non-diversifiable idiosyncratic risk. We derive a (non-linear) differential equation for the certainty-equivalent valuation of the PE investment, including an additional term that prices the idiosyncratic risk of the PE investment. Despite its richness, the model delivers a tractable solution and intuitive expressions for the certainty equivalent value of the PE investment. We obtain closed-form solutions for the optimal hedging portfolio and consumption rules. Finally, we solve for the alpha that the GP must generate before the LP breaks even. In our baseline calibrations, this break-even alpha is 2.61-3.08% annually. Importantly, our model produces simple expressions for the alternative performance measures used in practice. Given the break-even alpha, we calculate the corresponding breakeven values of the IRR, TVPI, and PME measures. Comparing these break-even values to their empirical counterparts, we find that the values are reasonably close. To illustrate, Harris, Jenkinson, and Kaplan (2011) report a value-weighted average PME of 1.27 and interpret this figure as evidence of outperformance, i.e., that PE funds have outperformed public markets by 27% on average. Our baseline calibration, however, produces a break-even PME of 1.30, suggesting that this outperformance is just sufficient for LPs to break even in certainty equivalence terms.
Finally, we evaluate changes in the GP's compensation contract, LP's risk aversion, and leverage. Our model produces a new benefit of leverage. In our baseline calibration, the break-even alpha declines from 3.1 to 2.1% annually, when the debt-equity ratio increases from zero to three. The benefit of leverage arises because it enables the GP to generate alphas on a larger asset base, yet leaves the fees charged unchanged. The cost of leverage is the increased risk and volatility. In all our calibrations, the first effect dominates. This provides a simple answer to the "private equity leverage puzzle" from Weisbach (2009, 2011) . They report that credit market conditions appears to be the only determinant of leverage levels in PE transactions, and PE firms appear to use as much leverage as possible when financing the transactions. Under the simple deviation from ModiglianiMiller in our model, this behavior is optimal.
Several empirical papers evaluate PE performance, but without adjusting for illiquidity and idiosyncratic risk. Kaplan and Schoar (2005) analyze returns to PE investments using a standard CAPM model, assuming a beta of one. Cochrane (2005) and Korteweg and Sorensen (2011) estimate the risk and return of venture capital investments in a CAPM model. Related, calculate the present values of various features of the GPs' compensation, such as management fees, carried interest, and hurdle rate, assuming a risk-neutral investor and simulating cash flows using the empirical distributions. Choi, Metrick, and Yasuda (2011) extend to compare the fair-valuetest (FVT) carry scheme to other schemes.
Our analysis also relates to a large literature about restricted stocks, non-traded labor income, and other illiquidity frictions, although existing models do not capture the features of PE well enough to evaluate actual PE performance. [TO BE COMPLETED] 2 Model Liquid investments. As in Merton (1971) , the LP has an infinite horizon and continuously rebalances a portfolio with a risk-free asset and the risky market portfolio. The risk-free asset pays interest at a constant rate r. The return of the risky market portfolio is independently and identically distributed, given by
where B R is a standard Brownian motion, and µ R and σ R are constant mean and volatility parameters. Let η denote the Sharpe ratio of the market portfolio,
Illiquid PE investment. In addition to the liquid investment, the LP invests I 0 , at time 0, in a PE fund. The LP cannot short the PE investment, so I 0 > 0. The PE investment is managed by the general partner (GP). This GP uses this investment to acquire A 0 worth of corporate assets. Without leverage, A 0 = I 0 . With leverage, considered in Section 6,
, where l is the D/E ratio. The PE investment is illiquid and must be held until a fixed maturity date T 1 , at which point the investment is exited and the assets are sold for A T . The proceeds are shared between the LP and GP as specified below. Subsequently, the LP will only invest in liquid assets, i.e., the risky market portfolio and the risk-free asset.
1 We assume that the value of liquidation is sufficiently low that it is never optimal to liquidate the asset before maturity T , and we ignore the secondary market in which the LP can potentially sell the investment at a significant discount.
During the life of this PE investment (0 ≤ t ≤ T ), the value of the PE assets follows a geometric Brownian motion (GBM)
where B A is a standard Brownian motion, µ A is the drift, and σ A is the volatility. The returns of the PE asset and market portfolio are correlated, and ρ is the correlation coefficient between the two Brownian motions B A and B R . Whenever |ρ| = 1, markets are incomplete, and the investor cannot completely hedge the PE investment risk.
The volatility for the PE asset's systematic risk is ρσ A , and the volatility of the PE asset's idiosyncratic risk, , is
In the second equality, β is the unlevered beta of the PE asset, defined as in the CAPM setting as
Analogously, alpha is defined as,
Under complete markets no arbitrage implies no risk-adjusted excess returns, hence α = 0. In our incomplete-markets framework, the LP must be compensated for holding nondiversifiable and idiosyncratic risks, along with fees, so α > 0. Below we calculate the minimum alpha required for the LP to break even.
Management fees. The GP receives both management fees and performance fees (carried interest). Management fees are paid on an ongoing basis. To fix terminology, the committed capital, X 0 , is the sum of the initial investment, I 0 , and the total management fees paid over the life of the PE investment. The annual management fee is typically stated as a fraction m, typically 2%, of the committed capital, hence
implying X 0 = I 0 /(1 − mT ). To illustrate, a ten-year PE investment of I 0 = $10 with a 2%
annual management fee implies a total committed capital of X 0 = $12.5.
Performance fees. At maturity T , the GP and LP share the proceeds based on a schedule (or waterfall), with three regions. The boundaries between the regions, defined shortly, are denoted F and Z. When the PE investment is liquidated at time T , A T is the total proceeds and A T − X 0 is the profits.
The first region, A T ≤ F , is the preferred return region where the LP receives the entire proceeds, and the GP receives no carried interest. The boundary F is the amount where the LP achieves an IRR equal to a specified hurdle return h, typically 8%. Therefore,
Note that h = 0 implies F = X 0 , and h > 0 implies F > X 0 .
The second region, F ≤ A T ≤ Z, is the GP's catch-up region. The GP receives carried interest equal to a fraction n, typically 100%, of the subsequent proceeds A T − F . This region lasts until the GP fully catches up, meaning that the GP's carried interest equals a given fraction k, typically 20%, of total profits A T − X 0 . Hence, the second boundary Z solves
With a positive h, the GP only fully catches up when n > k. When n ≤ k, we set Z = ∞.
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The third region, A T > Z, is the profit-sharing region. The GP has fully caught up, and the total carried interest is simply a share of total profits, k × (A T − X 0 ). The LP receives the remaining proceeds,
Liquid wealth dynamics. Let W denote the LP's liquid wealth process, including both the market portfolio and risk-free asset but excluding the illiquid PE investment. The investor allocates the amount Π t to the market portfolio and the remaining W t − Π t to the risk-free asset. The LP's liquid wealth dynamics are then given by
The first term gives the rate of wealth accumulation when the LP fully invests in the risk-free asset (net of the management fee, mX 0 , and consumption/expenditure C). The second term is the excess return from investing in the risky market portfolio.
LP's voluntary participation. With incomplete markets standard no-arbitrage pricing does not apply, and we value the LP's illiquid PE investment in terms of its certainty equivalent. Let V (A 0 , 0) be the certainty equivalent at time 0, taking into account management and performance fees as well as illiquidity. The voluntary participation constraint for the LP is
Note V (A 0 , 0) must exceed the invested capital I 0 , not total committed capital X 0 , because the costs of management fees (and carried interest) are included in V . With leverage, the cost of debt is included in V , and the voluntary participation constraint (11) still holds.
LP's objective. The LP has a standard time-additive separable utility function given by
where ζ > 0 is the subjective discount rate and U (C) is a concave function. For tractability, we choose U (C) = −e −γC /γ, where γ > 0 is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion (CARA).
Summary of frictions. The model contains three frictions: First, the investor cannot continuously trade the PE position. After deciding the initial exposure to PE, this position is held to maturity. This creates illiquidity risk due to irreversibility and inability to rebalance the PE position. Second, the PE position is large. The LP is not fully diversified and must be compensated for non-diversifiable risk. Third, the investor pays management and performance fees to the GP. Hence, to justify the PE investment, the GP must generate value and the PE asset must outperform the market, after adjusting for risk and fees.
We take the initial investment and committed capital as given, along with the α and leverage. Empirical studies present evidence of decreasing returns to scale in PE (e.g., Kaplan and Schoar (2005) . In our model, this could be captured by setting α = f (A 0 ), and including this constraint in the LP's initial problem when I 0 and X 0 are chosen initially.
Complete-markets solution
First consider the case with complete markets (CM). The LP's optimization problem can be decomposed into two separate ones: total wealth maximization and utility maximization. By dynamically trading a few long-lived assets, the PE investment can be perfectly replicated and thus investors demand neither idiosyncratic nor illiquidity risk premia. With a constant interest rate r and a constant Sharpe ratio η = (µ R − r)/σ R , the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) holds. With CM, there cannot be an excess returns, adjusting for systematic risks. Hence, α = 0, and the equilibrium expected rate of return µ A for the PE asset is
Using the standard dynamic replicating portfolio argument, as in the Black-Scholes setting, we obtain an ODE for the LP's value of the PE investment, V (A, t), as
The term −mX 0 captures management fees. The other terms are standard.
Boundary Conditions. The LP's payoff can be viewed as the sum of three distinct claims or tranches, corresponding to the three regions in the waterfall: (1) the LP's senior preferred return claim, (2) the GP's catch-up region corresponding to a mezzanine claim for the LP, and (3) the profit-sharing region corresponding to a junior equity claim. When valuing the LP's total investment, these three claims are combined to form the LP's boundary condition.
Hence, at maturity T , the LP's total payoff is
where LP 1 (A T , T ), LP 2 (A T , T ), and LP 3 (A T , T ) are the incremental payoffs in the three regions of the waterfall, as described next.
In the preferred return region, the LP's payoff is given by
where F is given in (8) and can be interpreted as the principal of the senior debt claim in the Black-Scholes capital structure terminology. In the catch-up region, the incremental payoff resembles a (1 − n) fraction of mezzanine debt, given by
Here, Z is given in (9) and can be interpreted as the sum of the principals of the senior and mezzanine debt claims. Finally, in the profit-sharing region, the incremental payoff is a junior claim, resembling a (1 − k) equity share, given by
Analogously, we could express the GP's total payoff as the sum of the incremental payoffs in the three regions. Alternatively, we can simply state the GP's payoffs as the remaining
The LP is assumed to honor the management fees regardless of the fund's performance, and the resulting liability equals the present value (PV) of the remaining fees,
Solution. We use BS(A t , t; K) to denote the Black-Scholes call option pricing formula, given in (A.4) of the appendix. Under CM, we can apply the Black-Scholes pricing methodology to value each tranche separately, as
where
The decision problem after exiting the PE investment
After exiting the illiquid PE investment, the LP investor faces a classic Merton (1971) consumption/portfolio allocation problem. The standard solution to this problem is summarized in Proposition 1. We use the value function J * (W ) from this proposition when analyzing the pre-exit decisions.
Proposition 1 The LP's post-exit value function takes the following form:
where b is the constant given by
The optimal consumption, C, is given by
The optimal allocation to the risky market portfolio, Π, is given by
Optimality and private valuation (t ≤ T )
Let J(W, A, t) denote the LP's pre-exit value function. The LP's consumption C and allocation to the risky market portfolio Π solve the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation,
In the appendix, we show that the LP's value function has the exponential form,
where the constant b is given in (24) and V (A, t) is the LP's private certainty equivalent valuation for the PE investment net of fees. We characterize V (A, t) shortly.
The LP's optimal consumption C is given by
which is a version of the permanent-income/precautionary-saving models.
3 Comparing to (25), we see that the LP's total certainty equivalent wealth is the sum of the liquid wealth W and the certainty equivalent of the illiquid asset V (A, t).
The LP's optimal portfolio rule is
where the first term is the standard mean-variance demand, the second term is the intertemporal hedging demand, and the unlevered β of the underlying PE asset is given by (5).
Following the option pricing terminology, we interpret V A (A, t) as the delta of the LP's PE investment with respect to A, the value of the underlying asset. The higher the β and the delta V A (A, t), the higher the hedging demand.
We next turn to the LP's private valuation of the PE investment V (A, t). In the appendix, we show that V (A, t) solves the nonlinear ordinary differential equation (ODE):
where is the idiosyncratic volatility for the PE investment given in (4) and α is given by (6). The nonlinear ODE (31) is solved subject to the same boundary conditions as in the complete-markets case, given in equations (14) and (18).
Unlike the complete-markets case, ODE (31) is non-linear, because its last term involves
A , a non-linear function of V A . Incomplete markets, non-diversification and illiquidity, invalidate the law-of-one-price valuation paradigm. An LP whose certainty equivalent of two individual PE investments, in isolation, are V 1 and V 2 , does not value the portfolio consisting of these two investments as V 1 + V 2 .
Results
Parameter choices. As described in the previous section, we can solve for the LP's valuation of the PE investment given a set of parameter values. When possible, we use parameter 3 See Friedman (1957) and Hall (1978) for seminal contributions. Caballero (1991) and Wang (2006) derive explicitly solved optimal consumption rules under incomplete markets with CARA utility. Miao and Wang (2007) derive the optimal American-style growth option exercising problems under incomplete markets. Chen, Miao, and Wang (2010) integrate the incomplete-markets real options framework of Miao and Wang (2007) into Leland (1994) to analyze entrepreneurial default, cash-out, and credit risk implications.
values from (henceforth MY) to help compare the results. All parameters are annualized when applicable. MY use a volatility of 60% per individual buyout investment, with a pairwise correlation of 20% between any two buyout investments.
MY report that the average buyout fund invests in a portfolio of around 15 buyouts (with a median of 12). Based on their estimates, we calculate a volatility of 25% for the total underlying PE asset.
Following MY, we use a risk-free rate of 5%. For parameters not in MY, we use a volatility of σ R = 20% and an expected return of µ R = 11% for the market portfolio, implying a risk premium of µ R − r = 6% and a Sharpe ratio of η = 30%.
The unlevered β of the PE asset is set to 0.5, implying a correlation between the PE asset and the market portfolio of ρ = βσ R /σ A = 0.4. We also consider other values of β for comparative statics.
We next turn to risk aversion γ and the initial investment I 0 . To assess reasonable combinations of γ and I 0 , we rely on the following invariance result.
subject to the boundary conditions,
Proposition 2 The invariance result also allows us rewrite the portfolio rule (30) in terms of the investment in the market portfolio relative to the PE investment,
The left-hand side of (35) is the ratio between the allocation to the risky market portfolio and the PE investment I 0 . On the right-hand side, the first term is the standard meanvariance term from Merton (1971) , and the second term is the dynamic hedging of the PE investment.
Approximate risk aversion. The invariance result also helps us calibrate the LP's risk aversion. In general, it is easier to calibrate a level of relative risk aversion, γ R , than absolute risk aversion, γ. In our model, the implied relative risk aversion equals γ R = γC. Substituting expression (29) for C(W, A, t) and expression (24) for b, and assuming that the LP's time preference equals the risk-free rate (ζ = r), the value of γ that approximates a given relative risk aversion is
With η = 30%, r = 5%, and assuming the PE investment equals 25% of the total portfolio value initially (25% = I 0 /(W + V (A, 0))), we obtain γ = 5 × (γ R − 0.9). Hence, a relative risk aversion of γ R = 2 implies approximately γ = 5. An investor with a smaller relative risk aversion or a smaller investment in PE as a fraction of total wealth will have a smaller γ.
Our baseline calibration uses γ = 2, but we consider the range from γ = 5 to γ → 0 for a risk-neutral LP.
Cost of investing with unskilled manager
Applying the invariance result, we focus on the properties of v(a, t) and its delta, v a (a, t) has an economic value of $74.6 (net of fees and carried interest) to the LP. Management fees and carried interest imply that an LP investing with unskilled GP loses 25 cents for each dollar invested in the underlying PE investment, I 0 . As discussed below, to break even (v(1, 0) = 1), the LP requires α = 2.61%.
A risk-averse LP demands an additional idiosyncratic risk premium. For γ = 2, v(1, 0) = 0.715. This extra 3.1% discount reflects the idiosyncratic risk premium. Hence, management fees, carried interest and idiosyncratic risk premium jointly imply that a risk-averse LP with γ = 2 investing with unskilled GP loses 29 cents for each dollar invested in the underlying PE investment, I 0 . In this case, the break-even alpha is 3.08%.
Panel B in Figure 1 shows that a more risk averse LP has a lower delta v a (a, t), which implies that the LP's certainty equivalent is less sensitive to changes in the value of the underlying asset. Intuitively, the more risk averse LP values the PE asset less and has a flatter valuation v(a, t). Hence, we have the seemingly counter-intuitive result that a more risk averse LP has a lower hedging demand.
Performance measures
Because of management fees, carried interest, and idiosyncratic risks, the LP will only invest with skilled managers. We define the break-even alpha as the minimal level of alpha that the GP must generate in order for the LP to participate. This break-even alpha solves I 0 = V (A 0 , 0), which is equivalent to v(1, 0) = 1. Given γ, the break-even alpha is independent of the amount of invested capital I 0 . In the baseline calibration, the break-even alphas are 2.61% for γ = 0 and 3.08% for γ = 2.
The alpha generated by a GP is difficult to observed directly, and more readily observable performance measures are used in practice. Harris, Jenkinson, and Kaplan (2011) summarize studies with empirical estimates of the three most common performance measures:
6 the internal rate of return (IRR), the total-value-to-paid-in-capital multiple (TVPI), and the public market equivalent (PME).
To define these performance measures divide the cash flows between the LP and GP into capital calls and distributions. Capital calls, Call t , are cash flows from the LP to the GP, and distributions, Dist t , are those from the GP to the LP. , where r t is the cumulative realized return on the market portfolio up to time t. PME is the value of distributed capital relative to called capital, discounted by the realized market return. Assuming β = 1, the empirical studies typically interpret PME > 1 as the PE investment outperforming the market.
Analytical performance measures. In our model, we can solve for the analytical counterparts to these performance measures. The LP's required IRR for the PE asset, denoted φ, solves,
which simplifies to
Here, EC(A; K) is the expected payoff of a call option with strike price K under the physical measure, as given in (A.14) in the Appendix. The expression for EC(A; K) looks similar to the Black-Scholes formula, but it calculates the expected payoff of a call option under the physical measure, not the risk-neutral one.
The ex-ante expected TVPI is defined as
where the numerator is the LP's expected payoff net of carried interest, and the denominator is the total committed capital. The solution is
In our model, the PME is defined as
There are three concerns with the standard PME measure. First, the denominator combines two types of cash flows, the investment I 0 and the management fees. Management fees are effectively a risk-free claim and should be discounted at a rate close to the risk-free rate. Second, the numerator contains the total proceeds net of carried interest. The carried interest is effectively a call option, making the LP's total payoff at maturity less risky than the underlying asset. Hence, it should be discounted at a lower rate than the underlying PE investment. Finally, the beta of the PE investment may not equal one.
To address these concerns, we define the adjusted PME as follows,
Here, E[ · ] denotes the expectation under the risk-adjusted measure, analogous to the BlackScholes option-pricing methodology. 7 We treat management fees as a risk-free claim, discounted at the risk-free rate. We discount the carried interest and the underlying PE investment, taking into account their different risks. Finally, we allow the underlying PE investment to have arbitrary beta. Our adjusted PME captures the systematic risks of these different cash-flow components. It does not capture the effects of idiosyncratic risk. More precisely, when an LP's risk aversion approaches zero, an adjusted PME exceeding one is equivalent to positive performance. With risk aversion, an adjusted PME exceeding one is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for positive performance.
In our model, the adjusted PME is
where RC(A; K) is the expected payoff of a call option under the risk-adjusted measure, given in (A.18) of the Appendix. Table 1 reports break-even values of the various performance measures. The break-even alpha solves v(1, 0) = 1 for various levels of risk aversion and beta. The break-even values of IRR, TVPI, PME, and adjusted PME are implied by the corresponding break-even alpha.
Break-even performance
Insert Table 1 here.
Effectively risk-neutral LP. For an effectively risk-neutral LP (γ → 0), the breakeven alpha is 2.61%. The GP must generate this excess return to compensate the LP for management fees and carried interest. This break-even alpha is independent of β, because alpha is the risk-adjusted excess return and there is no premium for idiosyncratic risk.
The break-even IRR, however, increases with beta, because IRR does not account for risk.
Quantitatively, the break-even IRR increases in lockstep with β. For example, as β increases from 0.5 to 1, the systematic risk premium increases by 0.5 × 6% = 3%, and the IRR also increases by this amount. Similarly, the break-even TVPI and PME also increase with β, reflecting the increasing expected return.
Empirically, a PME exceeding one is typically interpreted as earning positive economic value for the LPs. Table 1 shows that the conventional interpretation of this measure is misleading, when β differs from one. For example, with β = 0, the PME only needs to exceed 0.57 for the LPs to earn positive economic value.
In contrast, the break-even value of the adjusted PME, our newly constructed measure, equals one at all levels of β, because this measure appropriately accounts for the systematic risks of different tranches (e.g. management fees, carried interest) of the cash flows.
Hence, an effectively risk-neutral LP participates in the PE investment as long as the investment's alpha exceeds the break-even alpha, 2.61%, or the adjusted PME exceeds one, regardless of the systematic risk exposure. In contrast, the interpretations of IRR, TVPI, and conventional PME measures depend on the investment's beta.
Risk-averse LP. A risk-averse LP demands additional premium for bearing idiosyncratic risks. As the LP's risk aversion increases, the required compensation increases, and the break-even alpha increases. For example, with β = 0.5, the break-even alpha, increases by 47 basis points, from 2.61% to 3.08%, as γ increases from 0 to 2. Correspondingly, the breakeven IRR increases by almost the same amount. The break-even values of the remaining measures also increase with risk aversion. For the adjusted PME, the break-even value now exceeds one due to the idiosyncratic-risk premium. To illustrate, as γ increases from 0 to 2, the break-even adjusted PME increases from 1 to 1.04.
In Table 1 , the total volatility is constant at σ A = 25%. Recall that the systematic component of the volatility is ρσ A = βσ R and thus the idiosyncratic volatility is = σ 2 A − β 2 σ 2 R . As beta increases, the idiosyncratic volatility decreases, which causes the break-even alpha to decline. To illustrate, for γ = 2, the break-even alpha decreases by 56 basis points from 3.17% to 2.61% as beta increases from 0 to 1.25.
In our calibration, β = 1.25 is the case with no idiosyncratic risk, = 0. With no idiosyncratic risk premium, the break-even alpha equals 2.61%, regardless of risk aversion γ. The other performance measures, imputed from this break-even alpha, also remain unchanged.
Absent leverage, the primary determinants of the break-even alpha appear to be the management fees and carried interest. The idiosyncratic risk has a smaller effect.
Leverage
Motivating Leverage The use of leverage in PE has presented a puzzle. Axelson, et al. (2011) show that the patterns of leverage in PE deals is largely independent of the patterns of publicly traded companies. PE firms appear to be primarily driven by credit markets, and employ as much leverage as creditors permit. Under the standard Modigliani-Miller, argument, greater leverage allows shareholders to earn a higher expected return but at a higher risk, these effects exactly offset, leaving the shareholders indifferent. To overcome this, Axelson, Stromberg, and Weisbach (2009) present a model of ex-ante and ex-post discipline to explain the use of leverage. Our results provide a simpler explanation. With incomplete markets and GP ability, the benefit of leverage is that it allows the GP to apply their value-adding ability across a wider asset base, and the cost of leverage is that it exposes to LP to greater idiosyncratic and systematic risks. But there is no reason to expect these two effects to cancel. Our findings suggest that the first effect dominates, and a simple explanation for the use of leverage is that it permits GPs to apply their value adding ability across a wider asset base.
8 The economic cost of the corresponding increases in risk appears comparatively modest.
Pricing with leverage
At time 0, let l denote the debt-equity ratio. For a given amount of invested capital I 0 (equity), the value of debt equals D 0 = lI 0 , and the total PE asset equals A 0 = (l + 1)I 0 .
We next price debt from the perspective of well diversified risk-averse investors.
Debt pricing. Our model applies to general forms of debt, but for simplicity we consider balloon debt with no intermediate payments and where the principal and all accrued interest are due at maturity T . Let y denote the yield for the debt, which we derive below. The payment at maturity T is the sum of principal and compounded interest,
Intuitively, the expected rate of return on debt is higher than the risk-free rate because it is a risky claim on the underlying PE asset. Additionally, the PE asset has alpha, which implies that this debt has a higher value than the one implied by the standard Black-Scholes pricing formula. In the appendix, we show that debt is priced by
subject to the boundary condition (44). Despite the resemblance to the Black-Scholes debt pricing formula, our debt pricing formula is fundamentally different. Unlike Black-Scholes, our model allows for positive α, and hence the risk-adjusted drift is r + α. A positive alpha is critical, because it allows the LP to break even given fees, illiquidity, and idiosyncratic risk.
Like Black-Scholes, the risk-adjusted expected return on the risky debt equals the risk-free rate. The market value of debt at time 0 is then given by
where RC(A; ·) is the expected payoff of a call option under the risk-adjusted measure, given in (A.18) in the Appendix.
We solve for the equilibrium yield y(A 0 , T ) as follows. We calculate the candidate final payoff in (44) using the original debt D 0 and a candidate y. The resulting candidate value of debt at time zero D 0 then follows from the pricing formula (46), and the equilibrium yield is determined when D 0 = D 0 .
Boundary conditions with leverage. With leverage, the LP's claim is junior to the debt, but it can still be valued as three tranches over three regions. For the preferred-return region, due to the seniority of debt, the LP's payoff equals the difference between the payoffs of two call options,
where F is given in (8).
In the catch-up region, the LP's incremental payoff equals the fraction (1 − n) of the difference between the payoffs of two other call options,
where Z Lev solves
Here, Z Lev is the level of A T such that the GP catches up.
Finally, in the profit region, the LP's incremental payoff equals the fraction (1 − k) of the payoff of the option with strike price Z Lev ,
As in the case without leverage, the LP's total payoff equals V (A T , T ) = LP 0 (A T , T ) +
In the appendix, we derive expressions for the performance measures, IRR, TVPI, PME, and adjusted PME with leverage. These are analogous to the expressions without leverage, albeit more complex. We use these formulas in the following analysis. Tables 2 and 3 report break-even values of the performance measures for various degrees of leverage. Because of leverage, the break-even alpha now solves v(1 + l, 0) = 1, and the break-even IRR, TVPI, PME, and adjusted PME are implied by this break-even alpha.
Effects of Risk Aversion and Risk
Insert Tables 2 and 3 here.
Effectively risk-neutral LP. We first consider the effects of systematic risk on the performance measures. For an effectively risk-neutral LP, the idiosyncratic risk is not priced. Tables 2 and 3 report break-even performance measures when initial debt-equity ratio of 1 and 3 (l = 1, 3), respectively. The patterns are largely similar. Quantitatively, the effects are stronger with higher leverage. Unlike the case without leverage, we now have the credit spread for debt.
The first column in Table 2 , with l = 1, shows that the break-even alpha is 1.68% compared to 2.61% without leverage, a reduction of 93 basis points. This break-even alpha is independent of beta, because alpha measures the excess return adjusted for systematic risk. The credit spread y − r for debt is 1.05%. Importantly, this spread is also independent of beta because debt is priced as a derivative on the underlying PE asset with alpha.
As the unlevered β increases from 0.5 to 1, the PE asset's systematic risk premium increases by 0.5 × 6% = 3%, and consequently the break-even IRR for the LP increases by 4.2%, which is higher than 3% due to leverage. The break-even TVPI and PME are more sensitive to changes in β with leverage than without. For example, as we increase beta from 0.5 to 1, without leverage, the TVPI increases from 2.07 to 2.73. With leverage, however, the TVPI increases from 2.43 to 3.60, which is much more significant. Moreover, the PME increases from 0.88 to 1.30, and the usual interpretation of a PME exceeding one as equivalent to outperformance may be more misleading with leverage. For the adjusted PME, the break-even value equals one at all levels of β, because this measure appropriately accounts for systematic risk and leverage.
Risk-averse LP. As risk aversion increases, the LP demands additional idiosyncratic risk premium, and the break-even alpha increases. In Table 2 , with β = 0.5, the break-even alpha increases by 78 basis points, from 1.68% to 2.46%, as γ increases from 0 to 2. Correspondingly, the break-even IRR increases by 1.2%, and the break-even values of the remaining measures also increase. In contrast, the credit spread declines, because a higher alpha increases the debt value, implying a lower spread. In the table, total volatility σ A is constant, hence an increase in beta reduces idiosyncratic volatility, which also reduces the break-even alpha. The effect of beta on the break-even alpha is also significant. For example, as we increase the unlevered beta from 0.5 to 1, the break-even alpha decreases from 2.46% to 2.03% for γ = 2. Finally, as the case without leverage, β = 1.25 implies no idiosyncratic risk, and in this case all performance measures remain independent of risk aversion. Table   3 shows that all of these effects become more pronounced as leverage increases.
In sum, with leverage, the management fees and carried interest are no longer the primary determinants of the break-even alpha. The break-even values now also heavily depend on the magnitudes of risk aversion and beta.
Effect of Leverage
Insert Tables 4 and 5 here.
Tables 4 demonstrates the effects of leverage for an effectively risk-neutral LP (γ → 0). We consider various leverage levels of l from 0 to 9. The effect of leverage on the break-even alpha is substantial. The break-even alpha decreases from 2.61% when l = 0 to 1.00% when l = 3, and this annual alpha compounds over the life of the fund. Note that the decline on the break-even alpha is independent of the unlevered β. The economic intuition for this decline is as follows. With greater leverage, the GP can apply the alpha across more assets, and hence a lower alpha is required to generate sufficient returns to compensate the LPs.
The classical Modigliani-Miller argument would say that the LPs should be indifferent to leverage, but this argument does not hold with positive alpha and fees. Increasing leverage allows the GP to generate alpha for a larger amount of assets and charge lower fees per dollar of assets under management. To illustrate, by simply leveraging three times, the unlevered return for the asset value A T that the GP needs to generate in order for the LP to break even is reduced by 15%.
The adjusted PME equals one for all cases, because this measure appropriately accounts for the systematic risk and the effectively risk neutral LP demands no idiosyncratic risk premium. The credit spread increases with the amount of leverage. The leverage effect on credit spread is significant. For example, the credit spread is 3.48% when l = 3.
For beta greater than zero, the IRR, TVPI, and PME increase with leverage. With l = 3 and the unlevered β = 0.5, the LP's IRR equals 11.2% increasing from 7.9% by 3.3%. The TVPI increases to 2.81 from 2.07 when l = 0. The PME increases to 1.02 from 0.75 when l = 0. For the special case with β = 0, levered beta equals zero and hence IRR, TVPI and PME do not change with leverage (see Panel A).
Importantly, as the break-even alpha, credit spread is independent of the unlevered beta because debt is effectively priced as a derivative on the underlying PE asset. However, unlike the standard derivatives analysis, our underlying PE asset is not tradable and hence admits a positive alpha. Other performance measures including IRR, TVPI and PME all increase with the unlevered beta.
Comparison to empirical findings
We now compare the break-even values of the performance measures to the actual performance of PE investors. Axelson, Jenkinson, Stromberg, and Weisbach (2007) consider 153 buyouts during , and report that, on average, equity accounted for only 25% of the purchase price, corresponding to l = 3 in our model. Turning to the unlevered beta, a number of studies report levered betas ranging from a low of 0.7-1.0 (Jegadeesh, Kraussl, and Pollet (2010)) to a high of 1.3 (Driessen, Lin, and Phalippou (2011)). For a levered beta of one and assuming a debt beta of zero for simplicity, we obtain an implied unlevered beta of 0.25. This estimate seems unreasonably low because typical PE funds target firms whose risks are comparable to publicly traded ones. Using an average debt-equity ratio of 0.5 for a representative firm with levered beta of one, we obtain an approximate implied unlevered firm beta of 2/3. Hence, we use an unlevered beta of 0.5, which seems a reasonable starting point.
We view a sensible range of LP's risk aversion is 0 ≤ γ ≤ 5, with a preferable value around 1-2. These choices of leverage, unlevered beta, and risk aversion point to the second and third columns of Panel B in Their value-weighted TVPI multiple, however, ranges from 1.76 to 2.30, which is somewhat lower than our break-even figure. The empirical and theoretical IRR and TVPI measures are difficult to compare, however, since they are absolute performance measures, and hence they are sensitive to the realized market performance over the life of the fund. In our calibration, we assume an excess market return of 6%, but actual market returns have varied substantially over the past decades.
The PME is closer to a relative performance measure. Harris, Jenkinson, and Kaplan (2011) report average PMEs of 1.20-1.27. These figures are very close to our break-even values of 1.17-1.30. While an average PME greater than one is often interpreted as evidence that LPs have outperformed the market, this out-performance appears to be almost exactly equal to the amount required to compensate a risk-averse LPs for illiquidity and idiosyncratic risk in our model.
Management fees and carried interest
We first quantify the effects of changing management fees and carried interest on the breakeven alpha for the complete-markets case. Then, we turn to the incomplete-markets setting. Table 6 presents changes in the break-even alpha as management and incentive fees change, focusing on the complete-markets case (or equivalently, the case where the LP is close to being risk neutral). Panel A shows the impact of management fees for different levels of the debt-equity ratio l. Without leverage (l = 0), the break-even alpha moves almost in lockstep with m. As m increases from 1.5% to 2.0% and again from 2.0% to 2.5%, in 50 basis-point steps, the break-even alpha increases from 2.1% to 2.6% and again from 2.6% to 3.1%, in 50 basis-point steps. With a debt-equity ratio of three (l = 3), the break-even alpha becomes less sensitive to m. The break-even alpha only increases by about 15-16 basis points from 0.85% to 1.00% and again from 1.00% to 1.16%, as m increases from 1.5% to 2.0% and again from 2.0% to 2.5%.
Complete markets
Panel B illustrates the impact of the carried interest, holding management fees fixed at m = 2%. Without leverage (l = 0), the break-even alpha is less sensitive to k. As k increases from 20% to 25% and again from 25% to 30%, the break-even alpha increases from 2.61% to 2.83% and again to 3.07%, i.e.g, by 22-24 basis-point increments. The effect of a 5% increase of the incentive fee (carry) k has roughly half the effect on the break-even alpha as a 50 basis-point increase in the management fee m.
With a debt-equity ratio of three (l = 3), the break-even alpha becomes less sensitive to changes in k. In our example, the break-even alpha increases by about 16-18 basis points from 1% to 1.16% and further to 1.34%, as k increases from 20% to 25% and again to 30%.
Thus, with a debt-equity ratio of three, the effect of a 5% increase in the incentive fee (carry) k has roughly the same effect on the break-even alpha as a 50 basis-point increase in the management fee m. Note that the break-even alpha is independent of beta under complete markets, although this independence no longer holds under incomplete markets.
These results provide an alternative comparison for different combinations of management versus incentive fees (carry). The results summarize various compensation structures in terms of the required managerial skills, as measured by the break-even alpha. With a leverage of three, starting from a typical 2-20 compensation contract, an increase in the management fees m from 2.0% to 2.5% is roughly comparable to an increase in the incentive fees (carry) k from 20% to 25%. Table 7 shows how the break-even alpha relates to management and incentive fees for a riskaverse LP with a relative risk aversion around two. With incomplete markets, the break-even alpha depends on the beta for the underlying PE asset, and we focus on the case of β = 0.5.
Incomplete markets
Panel B shows the impact of management fees for different levels of the debt-equity ratio l. Without leverage (l = 0), the break-even alpha moves almost in lockstep with m. As m increases from 1.5% to 2.0% and again from 2.0% to 2.5%, in 50 basis-point steps, the break-even alpha increases from 2.56% to 3.08% and again from 3.08% to 3.65%, in 52-57 basis points increments. With a debt-equity ratio of three (l = 3), the break-even alpha is less sensitive to m. The break-even alpha now only increases by about 18-20 basis points, from 1.87% to 2.05% and again from 2.05% to 2.25%, as m increases from 1.5% to 2.0% and again from 2.0% to 2.5%. Table 8 illustrates the impact of increasing carried interest, fixing management fees at m = 2% and the unlevered beta at β = 0.5. Without leverage (l = 0), the break-even alpha is less sensitive to k than to m. As k increases from 20% to 25% and again from 25%
Panel B in
to 30%, the break-even alpha increases from 3.08% to 3.29% and again from 3.29% to 3.50%,
i.e., in 21 basis-point increments. The effect of a 5% increase of the incentive fee (carry) k has roughly 40% of the effect on the break-even alpha as a 50 basis-point increase in the management fee m.
Leverage makes the break-even alpha less sensitive to changes in k. In our example, with a debt-equity ratio of three (l = 3), the break-even alpha increases by about 13-14 basis points from 2.05% to 2.18% and again from 2.18% to 2.32%, as k increases from 20% to 25% and again from 25% to 30%. With a debt-equity ratio of three, the effect of a 5% increase in the incentive fee (carry) k has roughly comparable, but slightly smaller effects on the break-even alpha as a 50 basis-point increase in the management fee m (about 14 basis points versus 18-20 basis points).
To a first-order approximation, our incomplete-markets results corroborate the completemarkets results. Specifically, starting from a typical 2-20 compensation contract, an increase in the management fees m from 2.0% to 2.5% is roughly comparable to an increase in the incentive fees (carry) k from 20% to 25%. Both changes require an additional 20-25 basis points of alpha generated by the GP on the PE asset for the LP to remain indifferent.
Conclusion
We develop a model of the asset allocation problem facing an institutional investor (LP), who invests in traditional liquid assets as well as an illiquid long-term private equity (PE) investment. The model captures important features of PE investing, including illiquidity, idiosyncratic risk, and the compensation structure. The compensations structure distinguishes management fees from carried interest, and includes preferred returns, hurdle rate, and catch-up provisions. In addition to fees, the LP is also exposed to idiosyncratic risk of the PE investment as the PE asset is illiquid and markets are incomplete. In order for the GP to justify fees and LPs to break even, the GP needs to generate a positive alpha by creating value from managing the PE assets composed of the underlying portfolio companies.
We calculate the alpha required for the LP to break even in certainty equivalence terms.
Despite these institutional features, we derive tractable expressions for the LP's asset allocation rule and provide an analytical characterization of the certainty equivalent valuation of the PE investment. Intuitively, we interpret the GP's management fees and carried interest as a fixed-income claim and a call-option-type contract on the underlying PE investment, respectively. Using this analogy, we may apply the standard Black-Scholes option pricing formula to price the various "tranches" of the cash flows that are distributed to the GP and the LP based on the contractual agreement between the two.
This Black-Scholes-based exercise misses two important institutional features. First, the GP must generate alpha, which the standard Black-Scholes formula rules out by assumption.
Second, the LP demands an idiosyncratic risk premium, which is also ruled out by the assumption of complete markets in the Black-Scholes framework. Our formula for the LP's certainty equivalent valuation of the PE asset captures both these features. Implied by the LP's optimal asset allocation rule, our valuation model generalizes the Black-Scholes option pricing formula with two new terms: (1) the alpha term, which augments the riskadjusted drift of the PE asset from the risk-free rate r to r + α, and (2) the idiosyncratic risk premium term, which depends on the LP's risk aversion and idiosyncratic volatility.
Because of incomplete markets, the law of one prices no longer holds in our model. Given the prevalent usage of leverage in the PE industry, we further extend our model to allow for external debt and price the debt accordingly.
Quantitatively, we find that common variations of the management fees and carried interest lead to significant changes in the break-even alpha, representing the required value added by the GP for LPs to break even. In our calibration, for an un-levered PE investment, this break-even alpha equals 2.6% annually. Importantly, leveraging the PE investment, substantially reduces this break-even value. With an debt-equity ratio of three, the GP only needs to generate an alpha of 1.0% for LP to break even. Intuitively, leverage allows the to GP manage more assets and generate alpha on a greater asset base. Since management fees are calculated from the LP's committed capital, leverage reduces the effective management fee per dollar of managed PE assets. The decline in the break-even alpha with increasing leverage provides a new justification for the observed use of debt in PE transactions (given the existing structure of management contracts). Additionally, we show that both risk aversion and leverage have significant effects on the break-even alpha under incomplete markets.
Moreover, we quantify the effects of changing management compensation structure on the break-even alpha for the manager. We find that for commonly adopted leverage (with a debt-equity ratio around three for example), starting from a typical 2-20 compensation contract, an increase in the management fees m from 2.0% to 2.5% is roughly comparable to an increase in the incentive fees (carry) k from 20% to 25%.
Three new insights emerge from our analysis. First, we present a new risk-adjusted PME measure and shows that this measure can diverge substantially from the standard PME measures, raising concerns about the usual interpretation of a PME exceeding one as indicating outperforming the market. Even when the beta of the overall cash flows equals one (as typically assumed), the risks of the calls and distributions are substantially different, leading to a biased measure. Our results indicate that this bias may be substantial, and our new adjusted PME measure may better reflect the economic value of PE investments.
Second, the existing literature has largely evaluated the compensation structure by calculating the PV of the different parts and comparing changes in these PVs as the term changes, for example by increasing the carried interest from 20% to 30%. These PVs and their changes are difficult to interpret, however, and we recast this analysis in terms of a more meaningful trade off. Specifically, our model naturally frames the question in terms of how much greater value a GP must generate, in terms of alpha, for an LP to be indifferent to a change in the terms.
Third, our results provide a new explanation for the leverage puzzle in PE. The existing literature has struggled with explaining the leverage patterns in PE. Axelson et al. (2011) report that leverage in PE appears largely unrelated to leverage patterns for publicly traded companies. To explain this apparent puzzle, Axelson, Stromberg, and Weisbach (2009) propose a model of ex-ante and ex-post monitoring. Our results, however, provide a different explanation. Our analysis indicates that a substantial benefit of leverage is that it allows GPs to apply their value-adding ability across a greater amount of assets, and hence effectively lowers the management fees per unit of assets under management.
The model assumes that all capital is invested initially and all exits are realized at maturity. The analysis does not capture the dynamics of investment decisions over the life of a fund as well as issues surrounding the valuation of unfounded liabilities (in our model, management fees are simply valued as a risk-free annuity). While it is straightforward to allow for deterministic investment dynamics, as in , modeling stochastic investment and exit processes, possibly depending on the market return, introduces substantial additional complexity.
Appendices

A Technical details
We first derive the complete-markets benchmark solution and then sketch out the derivation for the incomplete-market solution.
A.1 For complete-markets benchmark
Simplifying, we have
where BS(A t , t; K) is the Black-Scholes call option pricing formula,
A.2 Incomplete-markets solution Solution after maturity T . After exiting from holding the illiquid asset, investors solve a classic Merton-type consumption and portfolio allocation problem by investing in the riskfree asset and the risky market portfolio. The wealth dynamics is given by
Let J * (W ) denote investors' value function after time T , i.e.
The following HJB equation holds
The FOCs for Π and C are
(A.11)
We conjecture that J * (W ) is given by (23). Using the FOCs (A.10) and (A.11) for C and Π, we obtain the optimal consumption and portfolio allocation given in Proposition 1.
Solution before maturity T . Substituting (28) into the HJB equation (27), we obtain
Using the FOCs for C and Π, we have the optimal consumption and portfolio rules given in (29) and (30), respectively. After some algebras, we have ODE (31).
Derivation for Proposition 2. Substituting V (A, t) = v(a, t) × I 0 into (31) and using γ = γI 0 , a = A/I 0 , x 0 = X 0 /I 0 , we obtain (32). Using (8), (9), and (14), we have (33).
Finally, substituting x 0 = X 0 /I 0 into (18), we obtain (34).
A.3 Technical details for various performance measures
For results in Section 5.2. Let EC(A; K) denote the expected payoff of a call option with strike price K under the physical measure, .14) where p 1 (K) and p 2 (K) are given by
Denote RC(A; K) as the expected payoff of a call option with strike price K under the risk-adjusted measure defined in the text,
For Section 6 with leverage. The market value of debt at time t is
Incorporating the risky debt, we define the ex-ante TVPI as
Similarly, the LP's ex-ante IRR solves the equation .25) which simplifies to
The PME is then given by
The adjusted ex-ante PME is given by
(1 − e −rT ) . 3.13 3.13 3.13 3.13 PME 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.13 Adj. PME 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
